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INFORMATION SET DECODING IN THE LEE METRIC WITH
APPLICATIONS TO CRYPTOGRAPHY
ANNA-LENA HORLEMANN-TRAUTMANN AND VIOLETTA WEGER
Abstract. We convert Stern’s information set decoding (ISD) algorithm to the
ring Z/4Z equipped with the Lee metric. Moreover, we set up the general frame-
work for a McEliece and a Niederreiter cryptosystem over this ring. The complex-
ity of the ISD algorithm determines the minimum key size in these cryptosystems
for a given security level. We show that using Lee metric codes can drastically
decrease the key size, compared to Hamming metric codes. In the end we explain
how our results can be generalized to other Galois rings Z/psZ.
1. Introduction
The hardness of decoding random linear codes is at the heart of any code-based
public key cryptosystem. Information set decoding (ISD) algorithms are the main
method for decoding random linear codes in the Hamming metric, whenever the
problem has only a few solutions. An ISD algorithm is given a corrupted codeword
and recovers the message or equivalently finds the error vector. Such algorithms are
often formulated via the parity check matrix, since it is enough to find a vector of
a certain weight which has the same syndrome as the corrupted codeword – this
problem is also referred to as the syndrome decoding problem. ISD algorithms over
the binary are based on a decoding algorithm proposed by Prange [30] in 1962 and
the main structure of any variant does not change much from the original: as a first
step one chooses an information set, then Gaussian elimination brings the parity
check matrix into a standard form and, assuming that the errors are outside of the
information set, these row operations on the syndrome will recover the error vector,
if the weight does not exceed the given error correction capacity.
ISD algorithms are of immense importance when proposing a code-based cryp-
tosystem. The idea of using linear codes in public key cryptography was first formu-
lated by Robert McEliece [25], in 1978. In the McEliece cryptosystem the private
key is the generator matrix of a linear code with an efficient decoding algorithm.
The public key is a scrambled and disguised version of the generator matrix, such
that the private key (and hence the decoding algorithm) is not reconstructable from
the public key. The message is encrypted by encoding it with the generator ma-
trix and adding a random error of prescribed Hamming weight. The owner of the
private key can recover the message by inverting the disguising function and using
the efficient decoding algorithm. On the other hand, if the secret code is hidden
well enough, an adversary who wants to break the system encounters the decoding
problem of a random linear code, since the public code looks random to him. The
best the adversary can do is hence to use the best generic decoding algorithm for
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random linear codes, which currently are ISD algorithms. ISD algorithms hence
do not break a code-based cryptosystem but they determine the choice of secure
parameters.
One of the main drawbacks of classical code-based cryptosystems are the public
key sizes. To reduce these key sizes, over the last years, many variants of code-based
cryptosystems have been proposed that use codes in the rank-metric, instead of the
Hamming metric. This raises the question if other metrics can be useful, as well.
This is why we study codes in the Lee metric for code-based cryptography in this
paper, and show that, for theoretical code parameters, the Lee metric can also lead
to a substantial reduction of the public key size.
Codes for the Lee metric are defined over integer residue rings Zm := Z/mZ,
for some integer m > 1. Therefore, we are going to use ring-linear codes, which
are defined to be Zm-submodules of Z
n
m. We especially want to focus on the most
preferred case of quaternary codes, which are defined over Z4, since this case has
been studied the most in the coding theory literature. In general, ring-linear codes
were first mentioned by Assmus and Mattson in [2], for important results see [16, 7,
6, 33, 32, 31, 27], for a more general overview see [15]. The idea of using ring-linear
codes for cryptography (in a quite different setting) first came up in [35].
We note that, although Z4-linear Lee codes can be represented over F2, there
exists no representation that keeps both the weight and the linearity of the Z4-code
over F2. Thus the known results over F2 cannot be used for the Lee metric. This is
why this paper presents the adaption of Stern’s ISD algorithm over the binary [34]
to Z4 and a general form of the McEliece and Niederreiter cryptosystems over Z4.
The complexity of the ISD algorithm then determines a minimum public key size
for a given security level of these cryptosystems.
The paper is structured as follows: in Section 2 we introduce the theory of ring-
linear codes, especially Lee codes, Stern’s algorithm over the binary [34] and the
notations and concepts involved in the algorithm. In Section 3 we present the
adaption of Stern’s ISD algorithm over the binary to Z4, including a complexity
analysis. In Section 4 we cover the applications of the ISD algorithm over Z4 to code-
based cryptography by stating the general McEliece cryptosystem using quaternary
codes and also the Niederreiter version. In this context we will also investigate the
key size of such a cryptosystem using theoretical values for the secret quaternary
code regarding 128 bit security against Stern’s ISD algorithm over Z4, from Section
3. We will then conclude this paper in Section 6 and add some open questions and
problems.
2. Preliminaries
In this section we introduce ring-linear coding theory, especially the Lee codes, as
well as Stern’s binary ISD algorithm [34] and the concepts and notations involved.
2.1. Ring-linear coding theory. In traditional finite field coding theory an [n, k]
linear code C over Fq is a linear subspace of F
n
q of dimension k. One can generalize
this by taking a finite ring R instead of Fq.
Let us assume for simplicity that R is commutative, but observe that the following
stays true in the noncommutative case.
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Definition 1. Let k and n be positive integers and let R be a finite ring. C is called
an R-linear code of length n of type h, if C is a submodule of Rn, with | C |= h.
We will restrict to the most preferred case of Zm := Z/mZ, for some m ∈ N. In
particular, we will formulate most of our results for m = 4, since this case has been
studied the most. Codes over Z4 are referred to as quaternary codes:
Definition 2. We say that C is a quaternary linear code of length n, if C is an
additive subgroup of (Z4)
n.
In traditional finite field coding theory we endow Fnq with the Hamming metric
to define the weight of a codeword wtH and the distance of codewords dH . In ring-
linear coding theory over Zm we could either use the Hamming metric or the Lee
metric. If we use the Lee metric the corresponding codes are referred to as Lee codes.
In what follows we will use the notion quaternary codes for Lee codes over Z4.
Definition 3. For x ∈ {0, . . . ,m− 1} we define the Lee weight to be
wtL(x) = min{x,m− x},
similarly for x ∈ {0, . . . ,m− 1}n we define the Lee weight to be the sum of the Lee
weights of its coordinates:
wtL(x) =
n∑
i=1
wtL(xi).
For x, y ∈ {0, . . . ,m− 1}n, the Lee distance is defined to be
dL(x, y) = wtL(x− y).
There is a connection between traditional finite field coding theory and Z4-linear
coding theory via the Gray map:
Definition 4. The Gray map is an isometry between (Z4,wtL) and (F
2
2,wtH) and
is defined as follows:
φ : (Z4,wtL) → (F
2
2,wtH)
0 7→ (0, 0),
1 7→ (0, 1),
2 7→ (1, 1),
3 7→ (1, 0).
The Gray map can be extended component-wise to
φ : (Zn4 ,wtL)→ (F
2n
2 ,wtH).
Note however, that the Gray map does not preserve linearity, i.e., that the image
of a quaternary linear code is generally not linear over F2.
We introduce the following notation: For a vector v of length n, a matrix A with
n columns and a code C of length n and a set I ⊂ {1, . . . , n} we denote by vI the
projection of v to its coordinates indexed by I, and by AI the columns of A indexed
by I. Analogously we define CI := {vI | v ∈ C}.
We will use the following definition of information set, since it fits perfectly in the
context of ring-linear codes:
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Definition 5. For a code C over Fq of length n and dimension k, we call a set
I ⊆ {1, . . . , n} of size k an information set if | CI |=| C |.
Similarly for quaternary codes we have what is sometimes referred to as the qua-
ternary information set:
Definition 6. For a code C over Z4 of length n and type 4
k12k2 , we call a set
I ⊆ {1, . . . , n} of size k1 + k2 an (quaternary) information set if | CI |=| C |.
The following proposition defines the quaternary systematic form of the generator
matrix and the parity check matrix of a quaternary code.
Proposition 7 ([16]). Let C be a quaternary linear code of length n and type 4k12k2 .
Then C is permutation equivalent to a code having the (k1+k2)×n generator matrix
(2.1) G =
(
Idk1 A B
0 2 Idk2 2C
)
,
where A ∈ Zk1×k22 , B ∈ Z
k1×(n−k1−k2)
4 , C ∈ Z
k2×(n−k1−k2)
2 , for some k1, k2 ∈ N0.
A parity check matrix of C is the corresponding permutation of the (n − k1) × n
matrix
(2.2) H =
(
−BT − CTAT CT Idn−k1−k2
2AT 2 Idk2 0
)
=:
(
D E Idn−k1−k2
2F 2 Idk2 0
)
,
where D ∈ Z
(n−k1−k2)×k1
4 , E ∈ Z
(n−k1−k2)×k2
2 , F ∈ Z
k2×k1
2 .
If we have a generator matrix of the form (2.1), to get a unique encoding, the
messages need to be of the form m = (m1,m2), where m1 ∈ Z
k1
4 and m2 ∈ Z
k2
2 . This
also explains why we say that the type of C is 4k12k2 . Encoding is done as follows:
(m1,m2)
(
Idk1 A B
0 2 Idk2 2C
)
=

 m1m1A+ 2m2
m1B + 2m2C

 =

c1c2
c3

 .
Hence the codewords are of the form c = (c1, c2, c3), where c1 ∈ Z
k1
4 , c2 ∈ Z
k2
4 and
c3 ∈ Z
n−k1−k2
4 .
For the syndrome of a codeword c = (c1, c2, c3) we get
(
D E Idn−k1−k2
2F 2 Idk2 0
)
c1c2
c3

 =
(
Dc1 + Ec2 + c3
2Fc1 + 2c2
)
=
(
s1
2s2
)
.
The syndromes s = (s1, 2s2) are such that s1 ∈ Z
n−k1−k2
4 and s2 ∈ Z
k2
2 .
For the Lee codes there is also an analogue of the Singleton bound.
Proposition 8 ([1]). Let C be a linear Lee code over Zm of length n and type m
k.
Then the Singleton type bound states that the minimum Lee distance dL of C is upper
bounded as
dL ≤ ⌊
m
2
⌋(n− ⌈k⌉ + 1).
Thus, for a quaternary linear code C of length n and type 4k12k2 the Singleton type
bound is
(2.3) dL ≤ 2(n− ⌈k1 + k2/2⌉ + 1).
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To compute the amount of vectors in Zn4 having Lee weight w, we have to sum
over all choices of i entries having Lee weight 2, of course only until ⌊w/2⌋. For
the rest of the n− i entries we are missing a Lee weight of w − 2i. We will achieve
this with entries of Lee weight 1, where for each of the w− 2i entries, there are two
choices: either 1 or 3. We will introduce the following notation for the amount of
these vectors:
c(n,w) =
⌊w/2⌋∑
i=0
(
n
i
)(
n− i
w − 2i
)
2w−2i.
With the Gray isometry we have that the number of vectors in Zn4 having Lee weight
w is the same as the number of vectors in F2n2 having Hamming weight w, which is
simply given by
(
2n
w
)
. Note, one can also check that
(2.4) c(n,w) =
⌊w/2⌋∑
i=0
(
n
i
)(
n− i
w − 2i
)
2w−2i =
(
2n
w
)
.
With this remark we can also state an analogue of the Gilbert-Varshamov bound
for quaternary codes.
Proposition 9. Let C be a Lee code over Z4 of length n and minimum distance d.
Then we have the following bound
(2.5) | C |≥
4n∑d−1
j=0
(2n
j
) .
Note that also the rate has a definition which fits perfectly in the Lee metric
setting:
Definition 10. Let C be a code over Zm of length n and type | C |= m
k. We say
that C has rate R =
logm(C)
n =
k
n . Thus, a quaternary linear code of length n and
type 4k12k2 has rate
R =
k1 + k2/2
n
.
2.2. Information set decoding algorithms. Many ISD algorithms and improve-
ments have been suggested to Prange’s simplest form of ISD (see for example
[8, 10, 11, 13, 20, 22, 36]), in historical order the proposed ISD algorithms are
by Prange [30], Leon [22], Lee-Brickell [21], Stern [34], Canteaut and Chabaud [9],
Finiasz and Sendrier [14], Bernstein, Lange and Peters [5], May, Meurer and Thomae
[23], Becker, Joux, May and Meurer [3] and the latest improvement is by May and
Ozerov [24].
All of the above mentioned ISD algorithms were proposed over the binary field.
However, with new variants of the McEliece cryptosystem proposed over general
finite fields, some of the mentioned ISD algorithms have been generalized to Fq:
Coffey and Goodman [12] generalized Prange’s algorithm to Fq, in [29] Peters gen-
eralized the algorithms by Lee-Brickell and Stern. Niebuhr, Persichetti, Cayrel,
Bulygin and Buchmann [28] generalized the algorithm of Finiasz-Sendrier with ef-
ficiency improvements by using partial knowledge of attackers to a general finite
field. In [18] Interlando, Khathuria, Rohrer, Rosenthal and Weger generalized the
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ball-collision algorithm by Bernstein, Lange and Peters to Fq. In [17] Hirose gener-
alized the May-Ozerov algorithm to Fq. And Meurer generalized the algorithm of
Becker, Joux, May and Meurer in [26].
The general idea of ISD algorithms is to guess an information set I ⊂ {1, . . . n} of
size k and the right distribution of the error vector corresponding to this information
set, such that we can recover the message from this information set. In the algorithms
we consider the information set I will be chosen randomly in each outer loop of the
algorithm. Nevertheless we want to note that there is a slightly smarter way to
do so, see [9], by reusing some elements of I in the next iteration and only adding
missing elements. For simplicity, we will just use a random choice.
Once we have chosen an information set I, we need to guess the error vector
having the assumed weight distribution. In the binary case this means we just have
to guess the locations of the errors. In Stern’s algorithm the error vector has weight
2v in the information set coordinates. The average complexity of ISD algorithms
is given by the cost of one iteration times the average number of iterations needed,
which is given by the inverted success probability. Note that the success probability
is given by having chosen the correct weight distribution of the error vector. In
Stern’s setting this success probability is(
k
2v
)(
n− k
t− 2v
)(
n
t
)−1
.
There are many smart concepts to speed up the cost of one iteration, some of
which will be explained in the following, together with their complexities:
(1) The concept of intermediate sums presented in [5] is important whenever
one wants to compute something for all vectors in a certain space. Consider,
for example, the setting where we are given a binary k × n matrix A and
want to compute AxT for all x ∈ Fn2 , of weight w. This would usually cost k
times w− 1 additions and w multiplications, for each x ∈ Fn2 . But if we first
compute AxT , where x has weight one, this only outputs the corresponding
column of A and has no costs. From there we can compute the sums of
two columns of A, there are
(n
2
)
many of these sums and each one costs k
additions. From there we can compute all sums of three columns of A, which
are
(n
3
)
many. Using the sums of two columns, we only need to add one more
column costing k additions. Proceeding in this way, until one reaches the
weight w, to compute AxT for all x ∈ Fn2 of weight w, costs k · (L(n,w)−n)
bit operations, where
L(n,w) :=
w∑
i=1
(
n
i
)
.
Note that the we need to take away the cost of the weight one vectors, since
they are for free.
(2) The next concept called early abort (also presented in [5]) is important when-
ever a computation is done while checking the weight of the result. For ex-
ample one wants to compute x + y, where x, y ∈ Fn2 , which usually costs n
additions, but we only proceed in the algorithm only if wtH(x+y) = t. Hence
we compute and check the weight simultaneously and if the weight of the
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partial solution exceeds t one does not need to continue. For the Hamming
weight one expects a randomly chosen bit to have weight 1 with probability
1
2 , hence after 2t we should reach the wanted weight t, and after 2(t+1) we
should exceed the weight t. Hence on average we expect to compute only
2(t+ 1) many bits of the solution, before we can abort.
(3) The third concept is the idea of using collisions. Instead of going through
all possible error vectors of weight 2v, fulfilling certain properties, we can
split this process. For this we consider vectors of weight v in one set S,
and vectors with disjoint weight v in another set T , such that two vectors
in the intersection of S and T determine the final error vector. The exact
definition of the two sets and the properties the vectors need to fulfill will
become clearer when we describe the actual algorithm, but we can assume
that we need to find x, y from some S ⊆ Fn2 and T ⊆ F
n
2 , respectively, such
that AxT = ByT + sT for some prescribed binary matrices A,B. Assuming
that x, y are uniformly distributed, the average amount of collisions is given
by
| S | · | T | ·2−n.
The assumption of a uniform distribution is commonly used, and justified
e.g. in [5] and references therein.
In the following we explain Stern’s algorithm over the binary field with respect
to the Hamming distance. For this we are going to use the following notation. For
S ⊂ {1, . . . , n} of size ℓ, we denote by Fn2 (S) the vectors living in F
n
2 having support
in S. The projection of x ∈ Fn2 (S) to F
ℓ
2 is denoted by πS(x). On the other hand we
denote by σS(x) the canonical embedding of x ∈ F
ℓ
2 to x ∈ F
n
2 (S).
We will use a formulation of Stern’s algorithm, which matches the ball-collision
formulation in [5]. The only difference between these two algorithms is the zero-
window of size ℓ in Stern’s algorithm, where no error is allowed, whereas in the
ball-collision algorithm, this window is split into Y1, Y2 and q1, q2 errors are allowed
respectively. For concrete parameters it turns out that, in most of the cases, q1 =
q2 = 0 is the most efficient choice and in a few cases q1 = q2 = 1 is more efficient.
Since therefore only a small improvement on concrete parameters results, we will
generalize Stern’s algorithm to Z4 in this paper. Nevertheless, using the ball-collision
formulation allows us to use improvements and speed ups like intermediate sums.
The setting for the algorithm is as follows: We are given the parity check matrix
H ∈ F
(n−k)×n
2 , the amount of errors we can correct t and the syndrome s ∈ F
n
2 . We
want to find a vector e ∈ Fn2 , such that wtH(e) = t and He
T = s. We are going
to use all the ideas mentioned above. The algorithm is formulated in Algorithm 1.
Note that, without formulating it in detail, the concept of intermediate sums is used
in lines 6 and 7, and the concept of early abort is used in line 10. The collision is
used in lines 8 and 9, since it is the same a in both cases.
Let us illustrate the algorithm in the easiest situation, where the information set
is I = {1, . . . , k} and the zero window is {k + 1, . . . , k + ℓ}. We get
UHeT =
(
A1 Idℓ 0
A2 0 Idn−k−ℓ
)e10
e2

 =
(
s1
s2
)
= Us,
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Algorithm 1 Stern’s algorithm over F2
Input: The parity check matrix H ∈ F
(n−k)×n
2 , s ∈ F
n−k
2 and the positive integers
v,m1, m2, ℓ ∈ Z, such that k = m1 +m2, v ≤ m1,m2, ℓ ≤ n− k and
t− 2v ≤ n− k − ℓ.
Output: e ∈ Fn2 with He
T = s and wtH(e) = t.
1: Choose an information set I ⊂ {1, ..., n} of size k.
2: Choose a set J ⊂ {1, . . . , n} \ I of size ℓ.
3: Choose a uniform random partition of I into disjoint sets X and Y of size m1
and m2 = k −m1, respectively.
4: Find an invertible matrix U ∈ F
(n−k)×(n−k)
2 such that (UH)IC = Idn−k and
(UH)I =
(
A1
A2
)
, where A1 ∈ F
ℓ×k
2 and A2 ∈ F
(n−k−ℓ)×k
2 .
5: Compute Us =
(
s1
s2
)
with s1 ∈ F
ℓ
2 and s2 ∈ F
n−k−ℓ
2 .
6: Compute the set S consisting of all pairs (A1πI(eX), eX), where eX ∈ F
n
2 (X),
wtH(x1) = v .
7: Compute the set T consisting of all pairs (A1πI(eY )+s1, eY ), where eY ∈ F
n
2 (Y ),
wtH(x2) = v.
8: for each (a, eX ) ∈ S do
9: for each (a, eY ) ∈ T do
10: if wtH(A2πI(eX + eY ) + s2) = t− 2v: then
11: Output: e = eX + eY + σJ(A2πI(eX + eY ) + s2).
12: Start over with Step 1 and a new selection of I.
where A1 ∈ F
ℓ×k
2 , A2 ∈ F
(n−k−ℓ)×k
2 and e1 ∈ F
k
2, e2 ∈ F
n−k−ℓ
2 , s1 ∈ F
ℓ
2, s2 ∈ F
n−k−ℓ
2 .
From this we get the conditions
A1e1 = s1,
A2e1 + e2 = s2.
The part e1 is chosen to be πI(eX + eY ) such that it has weight 2v, and with the
collision we ensure that the first condition is satisfied. The part e2 is chosen such
that its support is disjoint from e1, it has the remaining weight t − 2p, and the
second condition is satisfied, i.e., e2 = A2(πI(eX + eY )) + s2. Therefore
UHeT =
(
A1 Idℓ 0
A2 0 Idn−k−ℓ
) πI(eX + eY )0
A2(πI(eX + eY )) + s2


=
(
A1(πI(eX + eY ))
A2(πI(eX + eY )) +A2(πI(eX + eY )) + s2
)
=
(
s1
s2
)
= Us,
i.e., e = (e1, 0, e2) fulfills He
T = s and wtH(e) = t.
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Theorem 11. The average number of bit operations Algorithm 1 needs, is((
m1
v
)(
m2
v
)(
n− k − ℓ
t− 2v
))−1(n
t
)
·
[
(n− k1)
2(n+ 1) + ℓ(L(m1, v)−m1)
+ℓ(L(m2, v)−m2 +
(
m2
v
)
) +
(
m1
v
)(
m2
v
)
2−ℓ+1(t− 2v + 1)(2v + 1)
]
.
Proof. (1) As a first step we need to find the systematic form of the permuted
parity check matrix, and the corresponding syndrome form. As a broad
estimate we use the complexity of computing U [H | s], which takes approx-
imately (n− k)2(n+ 1) bit operations.
(2) To build the set S one has to compute A1πI(eX) for all eX ∈ F
n
2 (X) of weight
v. Using intermediate sums this costs
ℓ(L(m1, v)−m1).
(3) The set T is built similarly, since one has to compute A1πI(eY ) + s1 for all
eY ∈ F
n
2 (Y ) of weight v. Using intermediate sums this costs
ℓ(L(m2, v)−m2 +
(
m2
v
)
),
where the ℓ is added for adding s1 to A1πI(eY ).
(4) In the next step we want to check for collisions between the set S and T .
The set S consists of all eX , where eX ∈ F
n
2 (X) has weight v. Hence S is
of size
(
m1
v
)
and similarly the set T is of size
(
m2
v
)
. The collision lives in Fℓ2,
hence if we assume an uniform distribution we have to check on average(m1
v
)(m2
v
)
2ℓ
many collisions. For each collision we have to compute A2(πI(eX + eY ))+ s2
and we only proceed if the weight of this is t−2v. With the method of early
abort we only have to compute on average 2(t− 2v+1) many entries. Each
entry of the solution costs 2v + 1 bit operations.
(5) This sums up to the cost of one iteration being
c(n, k, t, v,m1,m2, ℓ) =(n− k)
2(n+ 1) + ℓ(L(m1, v)−m1)
+ ℓ(L(m2, v) −m2 +
(
m2
v
)
) +
(m1
v
)(m2
v
)
2ℓ
2(t− 2v + 1)(2v + 1).
The success probability is given by having chosen the correct weight dis-
tribution of the error vector, i.e. in X the weight v, in Y the weight v, and
in J the missing weight t− 2v:
s(n, k, t, v,m1,m2, ℓ) =
(
m1
v
)(
m2
v
)(
n− k − ℓ
t− 2v
)(
n
t
)−1
.
Hence the overall cost of this algorithm is given as in the claim by
c(n, k, t, v,m1,m2, ℓ) · s(n, k, t, v,m1,m2, ℓ)
−1.

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3. Information Set Decoding over Z4
In this section we adapt our previous formulation of Stern’s algorithm for Z4-
linear codes. We first formulate the algorithm and illustrate how and why it works.
Thereafter we determine its complexity.
3.1. Stern’s Algorithm over Z4. In this section we adapt Stern’s ISD algorithm
from F2 to Z4.
Recall from Algorithm 1 that the first step of the algorithm is to bring the parity
check matrix into a column permutation of the systematic form. Observe that the
systematic form for parity check matrices over Z4 is given by(
D E Idn−k1−k2
2F 2 Idk2 0
)
,
where D ∈ Z
(n−k1−k2)×k1
4 , E ∈ Z
(n−k1−k2)×k2
2 , F ∈ Z
k2×k1
2 . One could separate the
parts of the matrix living in Z4 and Z2 and use this in the algorithm, but it turns out
that the algorithm gets more complicated and slower with this separation, compared
to just considering the whole matrix over Z4.
Therefore, we consider the following system of equations that we get from the
systematic form of the parity check matrix H and the syndrome s, if the information
set is I = {1, . . . , k1 + k2} and the zero window is {k1 + k2 + 1, . . . , k1 + k2 + ℓ}:
UHeT =

 A Idℓ 0B 0 Idn−k1−k2−ℓ
2C 0 0



e10
e2

 =

 s1s2
2s3

 = Us,
where s1 ∈ Z
ℓ
4, s2 ∈ Z
(n−k1−k2−ℓ)
4 , s3 ∈ Z
k2
2 andA ∈ Z
ℓ×(k1+k2)
4 , B ∈ Z
(n−k1−k2−ℓ)×(k1+k2)
4 ,
C ∈ Z
k2×(k1+k2)
2 . From this we get the conditions
Ae1 =s1,
Be1 + e2 =s2,
2Ce1 =2s3.
We will choose e1 and e2 having disjoint Lee weight 2v and t− 2v, respectively. In
order to satisfy the first and the third condition, which only depend on e1, we will
check for a collision in the algorithm. The second condition will be satisfied by the
choice of e2. Thus, compared to the binary version we only get the extra conditions
2Ce1 = 2s3 on e1. The rest is analogous. In fact we choose e1 = πI(eX + eY ) and
e2 = s2−Be1 = s2−BπI(eX + eY ), where I is the quaternary information set, and
X and Y are partitions of I. Therefore we get
UHeT =

 AπI(eX + eY )BπI(eX + eY ) + s2 −BπI(eX + eY )
2CπI(eX + eY )

 =

 s1s2
2s3

 = Us.
The final algorithm is formulated in Algorithm 2. As in the binary case, we
implicitly assume that we use intermediate sums in lines 6 and 7, early abort in line
10 and the collision formulation in lines 8 and 9.
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Algorithm 2 Stern’s Algorithm over Z4
Input: The (n− k1)× n parity check matrix H over Z4, the syndrome s ∈ Z
n−k1
4
and the positive integers v,m1,m2, ℓ ∈ Z, such that k1 + k2 = m1 +m2, v ≤ m1,
v ≤ m2, 2v ≤ t and t− 2v ≤ n− k1 − k2 − ℓ.
Output: e ∈ Zn4 with He
T = s and wtL(e) = t.
1: Choose a quaternary information set I ⊂ {1, . . . , n} of size k1 + k2.
2: Choose a set Z ⊂ {1, . . . , n} \ I, of size ℓ and define J = {1, . . . , n} \ (I ∪ Z).
3: Partition I into two disjoint sets X and Y of size m1 and m2 = k1 + k2 −m1
respectively.
4: Find an invertible matrix U ∈ Z
(n−k1)×(n−k1)
4 , such that
(UH)I =

 AB
2C

 , (UH)Z =

Idℓ0
0

 , (UH)J =

 0Idn−k1−k2−ℓ
0

 ,
where A ∈ Z
ℓ×(k1+k2)
4 , B ∈ Z
(n−k1−k2−ℓ)×(k1+k2)
4 , C1 ∈ Z
k2×(k1+k2)
2 .
5: Compute Us =

 s1s2
2s3

, where s1 ∈ Zℓ4, s2 ∈ Zn−k1−k2−ℓ4 and s3 ∈ Zk22 .
6: Compute the following set
S = {(A(πI(eX)), 2C(πI(eX)), eX )| eX ∈ Z
n
4 (X), wtL(eX) = v}.
7: Compute the following set
T = {(s1 −A(πI(eY )), 2s3 − 2C(πI(eY )), eY )| eY ∈ Z
n
4 (Y ), wtL(eY ) = v}.
8: for (a, b, eX ) ∈ S do
9: for (a, b, eY ) ∈ T do
10: if wtL(s2 −B(πI(eX + eY ))) = t− 2v then
11: Output: e = eX + eY + σJ(s2 −B(πI(eX + eY )))
12: Start over with Step 1 and a new selection of I.
3.2. Complexity analysis. We now estimate the complexity of this algorithm. We
assume that one addition or one multiplication over Z4 costs 2 binary operations
each. We remark here that if a lookup table for the multiplication and addition is
used, the cost of one multiplication as well as the cost of one addition over Z4 will
be only one bit operation as well. All the following costs however, will be given in
bit operations and not using a lookup table.
As in the binary case we first determine the success probability for having chosen
the right error weight distribution. From (2.4) we know that the amount of vectors
in Zn4 having Lee weight w is equal to
(2n
w
)
, hence we get that the success probability
of having chosen the correct Lee weight distribution of v in k coordinates over all
vectors of length n having Lee weight w is given by
c(k,w)c(n, t)−1 =
(
2k
w
)(
2n
t
)−1
.
Next we determine the complexities of the separate speed up concepts in the main
part of the algorithm.
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(1) Intermediate sums: Over Z4 intermediate sums work similarly to the binary
case. We add as many columns of A ∈ Zk×n4 , each addition costing 2k bit
operations, as long as there are vectors having this Lee weight. Hence for
L¯(n,w) =
w∑
i=1
c(n, i) =
w∑
i=1
(
2n
i
)
the cost of computing AxT , for all x ∈ Zn4 , of weight w is 2kL¯(n,w) bit
operations. Observe that we do not take away the cost of the first step, over
Z4, since the first step is no longer for free.
(2) Early abort: This concept changes slightly when using the Lee weight over
Z4. On average we can expect 1/2 of the entries to have weight 1, 1/4 of the
entries to have weight 2 and 1/4 of the entries to have weight 0. Hence, on
average, we should reach Lee weight t after (12 + 2
1
4)
−1t = t additions and
therefore calculate t+ 1 entries, before we can abort the computation.
(3) Collisions: The average amount of collisions one needs to check between
elements living in Zn4 of a set S and a set T , under the assumption of a
uniform distribution (analogously to the binary case), is given by
| S | · | T | ·4−n.
Theorem 12. The average number of bit operations Algorithm 2 needs, is((
2m1
v
)(
2m2
v
)(
2(n− k1 − k2 − ℓ)
t− 2v
))−1(2n
t
)
·
[
2(n − k1)
2(n+ 1)
+ 2ℓ(L¯(m1, v) + L¯(m2, v)) + 2ℓ
(
2m2
v
)
+ k2
(
2m2
v
)
+ k2(L(m1, v) −m1 + L(m2, v) −m2)
+
c(m1, v)c(m2, v)
2k2+2ℓ
(t− 2v + 1)(8v + 2)
]
.
Proof. (1) As a first step we need to find the (permuted) quaternary systematic
form of the parity check matrix, and the corresponding syndrome form. As
a broad estimate we use the complexity of computing U [H | s], which takes
approximately (n− k1)
2(n+1) quaternary operations, i.e., 2(n− k1)
2(n+1)
bit operations.
(2) To build the set S one has to compute AπI(eX) and 2CπI(eX) for all eX ∈
Z
n
4 (X) of weight v. Using intermediate sums the first entry costs 2ℓL¯(m1, v)
and the second entry costs k2(L(m1, v) −m1), since C lives in Z
k2×(k1+k2)
2 .
Hence in total to compute S costs
2ℓL¯(m1, v) + k2(L(m1, v)−m1).
(3) The set T is built similarly, since one has to compute s1 − A(πI(eY )) and
2s3 − 2C(πI(eY )) for all eY ∈ Z
n
4 (Y ) of weight v. Using intermediate sums
the first entry costs 2ℓL¯(m2, v)+2ℓ and the second entry costs k2(L(m2, v)−
m2) + k2. Hence to compute T costs in total
2ℓ(L¯(m2, v) +
(
2m2
v
)
) + k2(L(m2, v)−m2 +
(
2m2
v
)
).
(4) In the next step we want to check for the two collisions between the set S
and T . The set S consists of all eX , where eX ∈ Z
n
4 (X) has weight v. Hence
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S is of size
(
2m1
v
)
and similarly the set T is of size
(
2m2
v
)
. The first collision
lives in Zℓ4, whereas the second collision lives in Z
k2
2 . We assume an uniform
distribution and hence have to check on average(
2m1
v
)(
2m2
v
)
2k2+2ℓ
many collisions. For each collision we have to compute s2−B(πI(eX + eY )).
With the method of early abort we only have to compute this on average
t − 2v + 1 times. Each entry of the solution costs 2v multiplications and
2v + 2 additions, hence 8v + 2 binary operations.
(5) This sums up to the cost of one iteration being
c(n, k1, k2, t,m1,m2, v, ℓ) =2(n − k1)
2(n+ 1) + 2ℓ(L¯(m1, v) + L¯(m2, v)) + 2ℓ
(
2m2
v
)
+ k2
(
2m2
v
)
+ k2(L(m1, v) −m1 + L(m2, v) −m2)
+
(2m1
v
)(2m2
v
)
2k2+2ℓ
(t− 2v + 1)(8v + 2).
The success probability is given by having chosen the correct weight dis-
tribution of the error vector, i.e. in X the weight v, in Y the weight v, and
in J the missing weight t− 2v:
s(n, k1, k2, t,m1,m2, v, ℓ) =
(
2m1
v
)(
2m2
v
)(
2(n − k1 − k2 − ℓ)
t− 2v
)(
2n
t
)−1
.
Hence the overall cost of this algorithm is as in the claim given by
c(n, k1, k2, t,m1,m2, v, ℓ) · s(n, k1, k2, t,m1,m2, v, ℓ)
−1.

4. Applications: Code-based cryptosystems over Z4
In this section we state a quaternary version of the McEliece and the Niederreiter
cryptosystem. For the key generation one chooses a quaternary code C of length n
and type h = 4k12k2 , which has an efficient decoding algorithm and is able to correct
up to t errors.
4.1. Quaternary McEliece. Let G be a (k1 + k2)× n generator matrix of C and
choose an n× n permutation matrix P , this matrix has no further conditions, since
the change of columns does not affect the Z2-part of the message, whereas for the
(k1+ k2)× (k1+ k2) invertible matrix S, we need further conditions: in the classical
case over finite fields, S is just a change of basis, but in the Z4 case, changing the
rows of the generator matrix affects the position of Z2-part of the message. Since
such a change hinders the constructor of the cryptosystem to tell where the Z2-part
of the message should be taken, we will restrict the choice of invertible matrices to
the following form: let S1 and S2 be k1× k1, respectively k2× k2 invertible matrices
over Z4, then S is given by
S =
(
S1 0
0 S2
)
.
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Compute G′ = SGP and publish (k1, k2, G
′, t).
For the encryption, let x = (x1, x2), with x1 ∈ Z
k1
4 and x2 ∈ Z
k2
2 be the message
and choose an error vector e ∈ Zn4 of Lee weight wtL(e) ≤ t. The cipher is computed
as
y = xG′ + e.
For the decryption one computes
yP−1 = xSG+ eP−1.
Since wtL(eP
−1) ≤ t and SG generates the same code as G we can use the decoding
algorithm of the code to recover xS and hence the message x.
4.2. Quaternary Niederreiter. The quaternary version of the Niederreiter cryp-
tosystem is done in a similar way by using the parity check matrix H and by comput-
ing its syndromes for encryption. Since there is no restriction on the message space
in the Niederreiter version, there will be no conditions needed on the permutation
matrix and on the invertible matrix.
Again, one chooses a quaternary code C of length n and type h = 4k12k2 , which
has an efficient decoding algorithm and is able to correct up to t errors.
Let H be a (n−k1)×n parity matrix of C, choose an invertible (n−k1)× (n−k1)
matrix S, i.e. det(S) ∈ Z×4 and an n × n permutation matrix P . Compute H
′ =
S−1HP T and publish (k1, k2,H
′, t).
For the encryption, let x ∈ (Z4)
n be the message of Lee weight wtL(x) ≤ t. The
cipher is computed as
y = H ′xT .
For the decryption one computes
Sy = HP TxT .
Since wtL(P
TxT ) ≤ t we can use the decoding algorithm of the code to recover
P TxT and hence the message x.
4.3. Key Size. To determine the key size we need to count the number of non-
prescribed entries of the public generator matrix. For this we assume that the
generator matrix is published in quaternary systematic form as in (2.1). Note that
one could also publish a generator matrix whose size does not match the size of
its systematic form in (2.1). For simplicity however, we assume that the sizes of
the published matrices match the sizes of their systematic forms. This allows us to
compute the size of the generator matrix in the form (2.1), or equivalently the size
of the parity check matrix in the form (2.2). The size of the public key, given by the
non-prescribed parts of either the generator or the parity check matrix, is
2(n − k1 − k2)k1 + (n − k1 − k2)k2 + k1k2 = k1k2 + (2k1 + k2)(n − k1 − k2)
bits.
In the following we study the key sizes of the proposed cryptosystem in Section 4
with respect to a given security level against Algorithm 2 provided in Section 2.2.
Two of the most studied families of Z4-linear codes are Kerdock [19] and Preparata
codes. Because of their small minimum distance Preparata codes are not useful for
our cryptosystems. Even though Kerdock codes over Z4 satisfy all the conditions
needed for the quaternary version of the McEliece cryptosystem, they seem to be
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a bad choice for key size reasons: while the key size of the cryptosystems doubles
going from code length n = 2m to 2m+1, the security level only increases by 3 bits.
For now we leave it as an open problem to find suitable codes for the use in a
Lee-metric public key cryptosystem. For the remainder of this paper we will use
only theoretical parameters, to illustrate how using the Lee metric could potentially
decrease the key sizes in a McEliece or Niederreiter type crpytosystem. We consider
quaternary codes achieving the Gilbert-Varshamov bound in the Lee metric, i.e.,
codes of length n and Lee weight d whose cardinality are at least
4n∑d−1
j=0
(2n
j
) .
Example 13. As a first example we examine codes of length n = 150 and minimum
Lee distance d = 81. The Gilbert-Varshamov bound tells us that such codes with Z4-
dimension 26 = k1+ k2/2 exist. We now vary k1 from 1 to 25, with k2 = 2(26− k1).
Furthermore, we set m1 = ⌈(k1 + k2)/2⌉,m2 = ⌊(k1 + k2)/2⌋, v = min(m1,m2, ⌊(t−
1)/2)⌋. With these parameters we get the following key sizes and security levels in
bits:
k1 1 2 3 4 5 . . . 13 14 . . . 24 25
key size 5198 5296 5390 5480 5566 . . . 6110 6160 . . . 6440 6446
security level 112 113 114 116 118 . . . 134 136 . . . 106 100
Table 1. Key sizes and security levels (both in bits) for GV-codes
over Z4 with n = 150 and d = 81.
For comparison, a binary code of length 2n = 300, dimension k = 26 and minimum
Hamming distance d = 81 gives a key size of 7124 and a security level of 27 bits
with the binary version of Stern’s algorithm.
Example 14. Given the relative distance d/n = 0.2, we search for a minimal code
length n, such that a k1 exists with which the security level of 128 bits is reached.
We get n = 425, k = 240, k1 = 55, k2 = 370, t = 42, and key size of 20335 bits.
Remark 15. All these theoretical values give much smaller public keys than the
classical McEliece system with binary Goppa codes achieves. For this note that for
the security level of 128 bits, the proposed parameters for the McEliece system using
Goppa codes by Bernstein et al. in [4] are n = 2960, k = 2288, which gives a key
size of 1537536 bits. In fact the theoretical key sizes presented here are within the
range of quasi-cyclic MDPC codes, which were submitted to NIST for post-quantum
code-based cryptosystem (from 10 to 37 kilobits).
5. Generalization from Z4 to Zps
In this section we give the general ideas how to generalize the ISD algorithm
and the two code-based cryptosystems to any Galois ring Zps for any prime p and
s ∈ N. The main thing that changes is the systematic form of the generator and
parity check matrix of the code. In general, a linear code over Zps has a (column
16 A.-L. HORLEMANN-TRAUTMANN AND V. WEGER
permuted) generator matrix of the form
(5.1) G =


Idk1 ∗ ∗ . . . ∗
0 p Idk2 p∗ . . . p∗
...
. . .
...
0 0 . . . ps Idks p
s∗

 .
We say that such a code has type (ps)k1(ps−1)k2 . . . pks . This is also the cardinality of
the code, and the uniquely encodable messages are of the form (m1,m2, . . . ,ms) ∈
Z
k1
ps × Z
k2
ps−1
× · · · × Zksp . If our code has length n, an information set is a set
I ⊆ {1, . . . , n} of size
∑
i ki such that |CI | = |C|. The parity check matrix in
(permuted) systematic form is in analog block echelon form (from the right) as the
generator matrix above.
5.1. Information set decoding over Zps. One can set up an ISD algorithm anal-
ogously to Algorithm 2. Instead of two conditions on e1 and e2 we then get s + 1
conditions, where e2 is chosen in order to to satisfy the second condition and having
disjoint support from e1. On the other hand, in order that e1 satisfies the remaining
s conditions one needs to compute similar sets S and T and check for s collision.
Larger values of s and larger values of p will increase the complexity of the algo-
rithm.
5.2. Code-based cryptosystems over Zps. The Niederreiter system can be used
as it is over any Zps . In the McEliece cryptosystem one just needs to make sure that
the scrambling matrix on the left has the correct block diagonal structure to prevent
mixing the subcodes that live in different subrings. The rest stays the same.
Since larger values of s and larger values of p will increase the complexity of the
ISD algorithm, they will reduce the theoretical key size needed for a given security
level.
6. Conclusion
In this section we want to conclude this paper and state some open questions and
problems, which could be interesting.
The change from the Hamming metric to the rank metric has recently received a
lot of attention in the code-based cryptography community, since the key sizes are
very promising. Following this idea, we propose the change to the Lee metric and
the ring-linear codes related to this metric. In this paper we built the framework for
the use of quaternary codes in code-based cryptography by generalizing Stern’s ISD
algorithm to Z4. This paper also gives the general form of the quaternary version
of the McEliece and the Niederreiter cryptosystem.
Here we provide some questions, which might lead to interesting applications and
further understanding of ring-linear codes and the Lee-metric in a cryptographic
point of view. Even though we restricted the focus in this paper on the case Z4,
and explained shortly how to generalize this to Zps, it is possible and it might be
interesting to generalize this to Zm, for any m. It is possible that some of the ISD
algorithms have a structure that correlates better to the Lee metric, hence there
might be other ISD algorithms which should be generalized to Z4. And the most
important question in order to have an application in cryptography is: which codes
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might be used for the quaternary version of the McEliece cryptosystem, such that
the conditions for the cryptosystem are satisfied and the key size is reasonable?
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